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Abstract
We consider the problem of computing additively approximate Nash equilibria in non-
cooperative two-player games. We provide a new polynomial time algorithm that achieves
an approximation guarantee of 0.36392. We ﬁrst provide a simpler algorithm, that achieves
a 0.38197-approximation, which is exactly the same factor as the algorithm of Daskalakis,
Mehta and Papadimitriou.This algorithm is then tuned, improving the approximation error
to 0.36392. Our method is relatively fast and simple, as it requires solving only one linear
program and it is based on using the solution of an auxiliary zero-sum game as a starting
point. Finally we also exhibit a simple reduction that allows us to compute approximate
equilibria for multi-player games by using algorithms for two-player games.
1 Introduction
The dominant and most well studied solution concept in noncooperative games has been the
concept of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a choice of strategies, one for each player,
such that no player has an incentive to deviate (unilaterally). In a series of works [10, 5, 3],
it was established that computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete even for two-player
games. The focus has since then been on algorithms for approximate equilibria.
In this work we focus on the notion of additive approximation and consider the problem of
computing approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. Under the usual assumption that
the payoﬀ matrices are normalized to be in [0, 1]n×n (where n is the number of available
pure strategies), we say that a pair of mixed strategies is an -Nash equilibrium if no player
can gain more than  by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. In [4] it was proved
that it is PPAD-complete to ﬁnd an -Nash equilibrium when  is of the order 1poly(n) . For
constant  however, the problem is still open. In [13], it was shown that for any constant
 > 0, an -Nash equilibrium can be computed in subexponential time (nO(log n/
2)). As for
polynomial time algorithms, it is fairly simple to obtain a 3/4-approximation (see [11] for a
slightly better result) and even better a 1/2-approximation [6]. An improved approximation for
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 = 3−
√
5
2 +ζ ≈ 0.38197+ζ for any ζ > 0 was obtained by Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou
in [7]. Finally, the currently best known approximation factor of 0.3393 was given by Spirakis
and Tsaknakis in [15]1 . Their methodology relies on a gradient-based approach and for more
details on this and related results we refer the reader to [16].
Our contribution. We provide two new algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria. The
ﬁrst one achieves exactly the same factor as [7] but with a simpler technique. The second
one, which is an extension of the ﬁrst and has a more involved analysis, achieves an improved
approximation of 0.36392. Regarding the running time, both algorithms are quite fast and
require the solution of a single linear program.
Our technique is inspired by [12] and the fact that we can compute exact Nash equilibria for
zero-sum games in polynomial time via linear programming. In particular, [12] have used the
equilibria of zero-sum games of the form (R + δZ,−(R + δZ)), for appropriate values of δ,
to derive well-supported approximate equilibria, which is a stronger notion of approximation.
Here R and C are the payoﬀ matrices of the two players and Z = −(R + C). In both of our
algorithms we use a similar starting point as follows: we ﬁrst ﬁnd an equilibrium (say x∗, y∗)
in the zero-sum game (R − C,C − R). If x∗, y∗ is not a good solution for the original game,
we then ﬁne-tune the solution and the players take turns and switch to some appropriately
chosen strategies. The probabilities of switching are chosen such that the ﬁnal incentives to
deviate become the same for both players. As a result, these probabilities are functions of the
parameters of the problem. The ﬁnal part of the analysis then is to choose these functions so
as to minimize the approximation error.
The intuition behind using the auxiliary zero-sum game (R − C,C − R) is that a unilateral
switch from x∗, y∗ that improves the payoﬀ of one player also improves the payoﬀ of the other
player, since x∗, y∗ is chosen to be an equilibrium with respect to R − C. This allows us to
estimate upper bounds on the ﬁnal incentive of both players to deviate, which we can later
optimize. We explain this further in the proof of Theorem 1. At the same time, through
our analysis, we discover some of the limitations of using such zero-sum games in deriving
approximations for general games by showing that our choice of parameters in Section 4 is
optimal for the one-round greedy adjustment framework that we consider.
Finally in Section 6, we show a simple reduction that allows us to compute approximate
equilibria for games with more than two players by using algorithms for two-player games. We
obtain a 0.60205-approximation for three-player games and 0.71533-approximation for four-
player games. To the best of our knowledge these are the ﬁrst nontrivial polynomial time
approximation algorithms for multi-player games.
2 Notation and Definitions
Consider a two person game G, where for simplicity the number of available (pure) strategies
for each player is n. Our results still hold when the players do not have the same number of
available strategies. We will refer to the two players as the row and the column player and we
will denote their n× n payoﬀ matrices by R,C respectively. Hence, if the row player chooses
1Interestingly, as noted in [16], a simpler analysis of the algorithm of [15] with a subset of the inequalities
that they use in deriving their upper bound also gives a 0.38197 approximation.
strategy i and the column player chooses strategy j, the payoﬀs are Rij and Cij respectively.
A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over the set of his pure strategies
and will be represented by a vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xn)T , where xi ≥ 0 and
∑
xi = 1. Here
xi is the probability that the player will choose his ith pure strategy. The ith pure strategy
will be represented by the unit vector ei, that has 1 in the ith coordinate and 0 elsewhere.
For a mixed strategy pair x, y, the payoﬀ to the row player is the expected value of a random
variable which is equal to Rij with probability xiyj. Therefore the payoﬀ to the row player is
xTRy. Similarly the payoﬀ to the column player is xTCy.
A Nash equilibrium [14] is a pair of strategies x∗, y∗ such that no player has an incentive
to deviate unilaterally. Since mixed strategies are convex combinations of pure strategies, it
suﬃces to consider only deviations to pure strategies:
Definition 1 A pair of strategies x∗, y∗ is a Nash equilibrium if:
(i) For every pure strategy ei of the row player, eTi Ry
∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗, and
(ii) For every pure strategy ei of the column player, (x∗)TCei ≤ (x∗)TCy∗.
Assuming that we normalize the entries of the payoﬀ matrices so that they all lie in [0, 1],
we can deﬁne the notion of an additive -approximate Nash equilibrium (or simply -Nash
equilibrium) as follows:
Definition 2 For any  > 0, a pair of strategies x∗, y∗ is an -Nash equilibrium iﬀ:
(i) For every pure strategy ei of the row player, eTi Ry
∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗ + , and
(ii) For every pure strategy ei of the column player, (x∗)TCei ≤ (x∗)TCy∗ + .
In other words, no player will gain more than  by unilaterally deviating to another strategy.
Other approximation concepts have also been studied. In particular, [5] introduced the stronger
notion of -well-supported equilibria, in which every strategy in the support set should be
an approximate best response. Another stronger notion of approximation is that of being
geometrically close to an exact Nash equilibrium and was studied in [8]. We do not consider
these concepts here. For more on these concepts, we refer the reader to [12], [16] and [8].
3 A (3−
√
5
2 )-approximation
In this section, we provide an algorithm that achieves exactly the same factor as in [7], which
is (3 −√5)/2, but by using a diﬀerent and simpler method. In the next section we show how
to modify our algorithm in order to improve the approximation.
Given a game G = (R,C), where the entries of R and C are in [0, 1], let A = R − C. Our
algorithm is inspired by [12], as mentioned in the Introduction, and is based on solving the
zero-sum game (A,−A) and then modifying appropriately the solution, if it does not provide
a good approximation. It is well known that zero-sum games can be solved eﬃciently using
linear programming. The decision on when to modify the zero-sum solution depends on a
parameter of the algorithm α ∈ [0, 1]. We ﬁrst describe the algorithm parametrically and then
show how to obtain the desired approximation.
Algorithm 1
Let α ∈ [0, 1] be a parameter of the algorithm.
1. Compute an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for the zero-sum game deﬁned by the matrix A = R−C.
2. Let g1, g2 be the incentive to deviate for the row and column player respectively if they
play (x∗, y∗) in the original game (R,C), i.e., g1 = maxi=1,...,n eTi Ry
∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ and
g2 = maxi=1,...,n (x∗)TCei − (x∗)TCy∗. Without loss of generality, assume, that g1 ≥ g2
(the statement of the algorithm would be completely symmetrical if g1 < g2).
3. Let r1 ∈ argmaxei eTi Ry∗ be an optimal response of the row player to the strategy y∗.
Let b2 ∈ argmaxei rT1 Cei be an optimal response of the column player to the strategy r1.
4. Output the following pair of strategies, (xˆ, yˆ), depending on the value of g1 with respect
to the value of α:
(xˆ, yˆ) =
{
(x∗, y∗), if g1 ≤ α
(r1, (1− δ2) · y∗ + δ2 · b2), otherwise
where δ2 = 1−g12−g1 .
Theorem 1 Algorithm 1 outputs a max{α, 1−α2−α}-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof : If g1 ≤ α (recall that we assumed g1 ≥ g2), then clearly (x∗, y∗) is an α-approximate
Nash equilibrium.
Suppose g1 > α. We will estimate the satisfaction of each player separately. Suppose b1 is an
optimal response for the row player to yˆ, i.e., b1 ∈ argmaxei eTi Ryˆ. The row player plays r1,
which is a best response to y∗. Hence b1 can be better than r1 only when the column player
plays b2, which happens with probability δ2. Formally, the amount that the row player can
earn by switching is at most:
bT1 Ryˆ − rT1 Ryˆ = (1− δ2)(bT1 Ry∗ − rT1 Ry∗) + δ2(bT1 Rb2 − rT1 Rb2)
≤ δ2 · bT1 Rb2 ≤ δ2 = 1−g12−g1
The ﬁrst inequality above comes from the fact that r1 is a best response to y∗ and the second
comes from our assumption that the entries of R and C are in [0, 1].
Consider the column player. The critical observation, which is also the reason we started with
the zero-sum game (R−C,C −R), is that the column player also beneﬁts (when he plays y∗)
from the switch of the row player from x∗ to r1. In particular, since (x∗, y∗) is an equilibrium
for the zero-sum game (R− C,C −R), the following inequalities hold:
(x∗)TRej − (x∗)TCej ≥ (x∗)TRy∗ − (x∗)TCy∗ ≥ eTi Ry∗ − eTi Cy∗, ∀ i, j = 1, ..., n (1)
If ei = r1, we get from (1) that rT1 Cy
∗ ≥ rT1 Ry∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ + (x∗)TCy∗. But we know that
rT1 Ry
∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ = g1, which implies:
rT1 Cy
∗ ≥ g1 + (x∗)TCy∗ ≥ g1 (2)
Inequality (2) shows that any deviation of the row player from x∗, y∗, that improves his payoﬀ,
guarantees at least the same gain to the column player as well. We can now use the lower
bound of (2) to estimate the incentive of the column player to change his strategy. He plays
yˆ while he would prefer to play an optimal response to xˆ which is b2. Since b2 is played with
probability δ2, by switching he could earn:
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCyˆ = rT1 Cb2 − rT1 Cyˆ
= rT1 Cb2 − ((1− δ2)rT1 Cy∗ − δ2 · rT1 Cb2)
= (1− δ2)(rT1 Cb2 − rT1 Cy∗)
≤ (1− δ2)(1− g1) = δ2 = 1−g12−g1
The last inequality above follows from (2). The probability δ2 was chosen so as to equalize the
incentives of the two players to deviate in the case that g1 > α. It is now easy to check that
the function (1−g1)/(2−g1) is decreasing, hence the incentive for both players to deviate is at
most (1−α)/(2−α). Combined with the case when g1 ≤ α, we get a max{α, 1−α2−α}-approximate
equilibrium.

In order to optimize the approximation factor of Algorithm 1, we only need to equate the two
terms, α and 1−α2−α , which then gives:
α2 − 3α + 1 = 0 (3)
The solution to (3) in the interval [0, 1] is α = 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.38197. Note that α = 1 − 1/φ,
where φ is the golden ratio. Since α is an irrational number, we need to ensure that we can
still do the comparison g1 ≤ α to be able to run Algorithm 1 (note that this is the only point
where the algorithm uses the value of α). But to test g1 ≤ 3 −
√
5/2, it suﬃces to test if
(3− 2g1)2 ≥ 5 and clearly g1 is a polynomially sized rational number. Concerning complexity,
zero-sum games can be solved in polynomial time by linear programming. All the other steps
of the algorithm require only polynomial time. Therefore, Theorem 1 implies:
Corollary 2 We can compute in polynomial time a 3−
√
5
2 -approximate Nash equilibrium for
bimatrix games.
4 An Improved Approximation
In this section we obtain a better approximation of 1/2 − 1/(3√6) ≈ 0.36392 by essentially
proposing a diﬀerent solution in the cases where Algorithm 1 approaches its worst case guar-
antee. We ﬁrst give some motivation for the new algorithm. From the analysis of Algorithm
1, one can easily check that as long as g1 belongs to [0, 1/3] ∪ [1/2, 1], we can have a 1/3-
approximation if we run the algorithm with any α ∈ [1/3, 1/2). Therefore, the bottleneck for
getting a better guarantee is when the maximum incentive to deviate is in [1/3, 1/2]. In this
case, we will change the algorithm so that the row player will play a mix of r1 and x∗. Note
that in Algorithm 1, the probability of playing r1 is either 0 or 1 depending on the value of
g1. This probability will now be a more complicated function of g1, derived from a certain
optimization problem. As for the column player, we again compute b2 which is now the best
response to the mixture of r1 and x∗- not only to r1. Then we compute an appropriate mixture
of b2 and y∗. Again, the probability of playing b2 is chosen so as to equate the incentives of the
two players to defect. Finally we should note that our modiﬁcation will be not on [1/3, 1/2]
but instead on a subinterval of the form [1/3, β], where β is derived from the optimization that
we perform in our analysis.
Algorithm 2
1. Compute an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for the zero-sum game deﬁned by the matrix A = R−C.
2. As in Algorithm 1, let g1, g2 be the incentive to deviate for the row and column player re-
spectively if they play (x∗, y∗) in the original game, i.e., g1 = maxi=1,...,n eTi Ry
∗ − (x∗)TRy∗
and g2 = maxi=1,...,n (x∗)TCei − (x∗)TCy∗. Without loss of generality, assume, that
g1 ≥ g2.
3. Let r1 ∈ argmaxei eTi Ry∗ be an optimal response of the row player to the strategy y∗.
4. The row player will play a mixture of r1 and x∗, where the probability of playing r1 is
given by:
δ1 = δ1(g1) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, if g1 ∈ [0, 1/3]
Δ1(g1), if g1 ∈ (1/3, β]
1, otherwise
where Δ1(g1) = (1− g1)
(
−1 +
√
1 + 11−2g1 − 1g1
)
.
5. Let b2 be an optimal response of the column player to ((1 − δ1)x∗ + δ1r1), i.e., b2 ∈
argmaxei ((1− δ1)x∗ + δ1r1)TCei. Let also h2 = (x∗)TCb2 − (x∗)TCy∗, i.e., the gain
from switching to b2 if the row player plays x∗.
6. The column player will play a mixture of b2 and y∗, where the probability of playing b2
is given by:
δ2 = δ2(δ1, g1, h2) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, if g1 ∈ [0, 1/3]
max{0,Δ2(δ1, g1, h2)}, if g1 ∈ (1/3, β]
1−g1
2−g1 , otherwise
where Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) =
δ1−g1+(1−δ1)h2
1+δ1−g1 .
7. Output (xˆ, yˆ) = ((1− δ1)x∗ + δ1r1, (1 − δ2)y∗ + δ2b2).
In our analysis, we will take β to be the solution to Δ1(g1) = 1 in [1/3, 1/2], which coincides
with the root of the polynomial x3 − x2 − 2x + 1 in that interval and it is:
β =
1
3
+
√
7
3
cos
(
1
3
tan−1
(
3
√
3
))
−
√
21
3
sin
(
1
3
tan−1
(
3
√
3
))
(4)
Calculations show 0.445041 ≤ β ≤ 0.445042. The emergence of β in our analysis is explained
in Lemma 3.
Remark 1 The actual probabilities δ1 and δ2 can be irrational numbers (and so is β). How-
ever, for any constant  > 0, we can take approximations of high enough accuracy of all the
square roots that are involved in the calculations so that the ﬁnal loss in the approximation
ratio will be at most . From now on, for ease of exposition, we will carry out the analysis of
Algorithm 2, as if we can compute exactly all the expressions involved.
Note that for g1 ∈ [13 , 12 ] and δ1 ∈ [0, 1] the denominators that appear in the functions Δ1, Δ2
do not vanish. The following lemma ensures that xˆ is a valid strategy. It will be proved in
Section 5. That yˆ is also a valid strategy is proved within Lemma 4.
Lemma 3 For g1 ∈ (1/3, β] we have Δ1(g1) ∈ [0, 1].
Now we bound the incentives of players to deviate. Let F be the following function:
F (δ1, g1, h2) :=
(δ1 (1− g1 − h2) + h2) (1− (1− δ1)h2)
1 + δ1 − g1 (5)
Lemma 4 The pair of strategies (xˆ, yˆ) is a λ-Nash equilibrium for game (R,C) with
λ ≤
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
g1 if g1 ≤ 1/3
maxh2∈[0,g1]
{
F (δ1, g1, h2) if Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0
(1− δ1)g1 if Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0 if g1 ∈ (1/3, β]
1−g1
2−g1 if g1 > β
(6)
Proof : In the case that g1 ∈ [0, 1/3] ∪ [β, 1], the answer essentially follows from the proof
of Theorem 1. The interesting case is when g1 ∈ [1/3, β].
Case 1: g1 ≤ 1/3
(xˆ, yˆ) = (x∗, y∗) which is by deﬁnition a g1-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Case 2a: g1 ∈ (1/3, β] and Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0
Recall that Lemma 3 implies xˆ is a valid strategy in Case 2. Observe, that δ2(g1, δ1, h2) =
Δ2(g1, δ1, h2) =
δ1−g1+(1−δ1)h2
1+δ1−g1 ≤ 1 is a valid probability, and therefore yˆ is a valid mixed
strategy too.
We estimate the incentive for the row player to deviate from xˆ. If b1 is an optimal response to
yˆ, then the gain from switching is at most:
bT1 Ryˆ − xˆTRyˆ = (b1 − xˆ)TRyˆ =
= δ2(b1 − xˆ)TRb2 +(1− δ2)(b1 − xˆ)TRy∗
≤ δ2(1− xˆTRb2) +(1− δ2)(b1 − xˆ)TRy∗
= δ2(1− δ1rT1 Rb2 − (1− δ1)(x∗)TRb2) +(1− δ2)(δ1(b1 − r1)TRy∗ + (1− δ1)(b1 − x∗)TRy∗)
By (1) we have (x∗)TRb2 ≥ (x∗)TCb2− (x∗)TCy∗+ (x∗)TRy∗ ≥ h2. Also r1 is a best response
to y∗, hence (b1 − r1)TRy∗ ≤ 0 and (b1 − x∗)TRy∗ ≤ g1. Therefore, the gain from deviating is
at most:
bT1 Ryˆ − xˆTRyˆ ≤ δ2(1− (1− δ1)h2) + (1− δ2)(1 − δ1)g1 = EST1.
We now estimate the incentive of the column player to switch. The best response to xˆ for the
column player is b2, which is played with probability δ2. Thus the incentive to deviate from yˆ
is:
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCyˆ = (1− δ2)(xˆTCb2 − xˆTCy∗)
= (1− δ2)((1− δ1)((x∗)TCb2 − (x∗)TCy∗) + δ1(rT1 Cb2 − rT1 Cy∗))
≤ (1− δ2)((1− δ1)h2 + δ1(1− g1)) = EST2
The last inequality follows from the deﬁnitions of g1 and h2. It remains to observe that our
choice of δ2(δ1, g1, h2) =
δ1−g1+(1−δ1)h2
1+δ1−g1 makes these estimates both equal to F (δ1, g1, h2):
EST1 = EST2 =
(δ1 (1− g1 − h2) + h2) (1− (1− δ1)h2)
δ1 + 1− g1 = F (δ1, g1, h2).
Case 2b: g1 ∈ (1/3, β] and Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0
Then yˆ = y∗ and the best response of the row player is r1. Hence he can improve his payoﬀ
by at most
rT1 Ry
∗ − xˆTRy∗ = rT1 Ry∗ − (δ1 · rT1 Ry∗ + (1− δ1)((x∗)TRy∗)) = (1− δ1)g1
while the column player can improve by at most
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCy∗ = δ1(rT1 Cb2 − rT1 Cy∗) + (1− δ1)((x∗)TCb2 − (x∗)TCy∗)
By (1) we can see that rT1 Cy
∗ ≥ g1. Hence
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCy∗ ≤ δ1(1− g1) + (1− δ1)h2
It is easy to check that Δ2(g1, δ1, h2) < 0 implies δ1(1−g1)+(1−δ1)h2 < (1−δ1)g1. Therefore
the maximum incentive to deviate in this case is at most (1 − δ1)g1. Combining Case 2a and
Case 2b, and taking the worst possible case over the range of h2 (recall that h2 ≤ g2 ≤ g1), we
get precisely the expression in the statement of Lemma 4.
Case 3: g1 > β
Notice that in this case, the players are playing the same strategies as in Algorithm 1, when
g1 ≥ α. By the analysis in the proof of Theorem 1, we see that the maximum incentive is
(1− g1)/(2 − g1). 
We will now argue that our choice of Δ1(g1) is optimal for any g1 ∈ (13 , β] and that the
expression (6) from Lemma 4 achieves an improvement over Algorithm 1. For this, we need to
ﬁnd the worst possible approximation in Case 2 of Lemma 4. In particular, we need to look
at the maxima of the following function:
P (g1) := min
δ1∈[0,1]
max
h2∈[0,g1]
{
F (δ1, g1, h2) if Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0
(1− δ1)g1 if Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0 (7)
Lemma 5 The tuple (δ1, h2) = (Δ1(g1), g1) is an optimal solution for the expression P (g1).
Furthermore, the maximum of P (g1) over g1 is 12 − 13√6 , i.e., the following holds
P (g1) = F (Δ1(g1), g1, g1) ∀g1 ∈ [13 ,
1
2
] (8)
max
g1∈[ 13 ,β]
P (g1) =
1
2
− 1
3
√
6
≤ 0.36392. (9)
The lemma will be proved in Section 5. Given Remark 1, we are now ready to conclude with
the following:
β1/3 g1
3−√5
2
1
2
− 1
3
√
6
F (Δ(g1),g1,g1)
g1
1−g1
2−g1
ﬀ case 1 ﬀ case 2 ﬀ case 3 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Figure 1: How the approximation factor depends on g1.
Theorem 6 For any  > 0, Algorithm 2 computes a (0.36392 + )-approximate Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof : By Lemma 4 the output of Algorithm 2, (xˆ, yˆ) is a pair of mixed strategies for
players, such that the incentive of players to deviate is bounded by (6). By Lemma 5 we have
that for g1 ∈ (1/3, β] the expression (6) is bounded by 12 − 13√6 ≤ 0.36392. It is easy to
observe, that for other values of g1 the expression (6) takes only smaller values. In particular,
it is at most 1/3 when g1 ∈ [0, 1/3] and at most 1−β2−β ≈ 0.3569 when g1 > β. The dependence
of the approximation on the variable g1 is presented in Figure 1. 
A Tight Example: The analysis that we have presented is tight. Tracing all inequalities
used, we constructed the following worst-case example, on which Algorithm 2 yields a 0.36392-
approximate equilibrium:
R =
⎛
⎝ 0 α αα 0 1
α 1 0
⎞
⎠ C =
⎛
⎝ 0 α αα 1 1/2
α 1/2 1
⎞
⎠ where α = 1/√6.
5 Proof of Lemma 3 and Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 3 :
We show that Δ1 maps [1/3, β] into [0, 1], where Δ1 (see Algorithm 2) is deﬁned as
Δ1(g1) := (1− g1)
(
−1 +
√
1 +
1
1− 2g1 −
1
g1
)
.
It is easy to check that Δ1(1/3) = 0. We will show that Δ1 is real-valued and monotone
increasing on the interval [1/3, 1/2). Then we show that 1/3 < β < 1/2, and Δ1(β) = 1.
To check that Δ1(g1) takes real values on [1/3, 1/2), it is easy to verify that the radicand, i.e.,
the expression under the square root, is nonnegative in this domain.(
1 +
1
1− 2g1 −
1
g1
)
≥ 1 for all g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2). (10)
To check the monotonicity of Δ1(g1), we calculate Δ′1(g1) and ﬁnd
Δ′1(g1) = 1 +
1− 3g1 − 2g21 + 14g31 − 8g41
2(1− 2g1)2g21
√
1 + 11−2g1 − 1g1
> 0 for all g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2). (11)
The inequality in (11) is obtained as follows: Inequality (10) shows that the radicand in (11)
is strictly positive on [1/3, 1/2). So the denominator appearing in Δ′1(g1) is real and positive.
For the numerator appearing in Δ′1(g1) the following estimation holds for all g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2):
1− 3g1 − 2g21 + 14g31 − 8g41 = 12(3 + g1 +(1− g1)(4g1 + 1)( −2 + (1− 2g1)2) )
≥ 12(3 + g1 +(1− g1)(4g1 + 1)( −2 ) )
= 12
(
(1− 52g1)2 + 74g21
)
> 0.
Here the ﬁrst inequality holds since g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2) implies (1− g1)(4g1 + 1) > 0. This proves
(11) showing that Δ1 is strictly increasing on the interval [1/3, 1/2).
Now we calculate g ∈ [1/3, 1/2) for which Δ1(g) = 1 holds. In the following let x ∈ [1/3, 1/2).
This implies 0 < 2 − x and 0 < 1 − x, which together with (10) gives rise to the second
equivalence in the following:
Δ1(x) = 1 ⇔ (2− x) = (1− x)
√
1 + 11−2x − 1x
⇔ (2− x)2 = (1− x)2
(
1 + 11−2x − 1x
)
⇔ 1− 2x− x2 + x3 = 0.
The polynomial p(x) := 1− 2x−x2 +x3 has exactly one zero in [1/3, 1/2], since p is monotone
decreasing on this domain: One calculates p′(x) = −2x − 2(1 − 3x2) ≤ −2x < 0 for all
x ∈ [1/3, 1/2]. Moreover one has p(1/3) = 7/27 and p(1/2) = −1/8, showing that p has a root
within the interval.
Substituting x = 13
(
1 +
√
7 cos (α)−√21 sin (α)) and α = arctan(t)/3 leads to
1− 2x− x2 + x3 = 7
27
(
1−
√
28 cos(3α)
)
=
7
27
(
1−
√
1 + 27√
1 + t2
)
where the last term is zero for t = 3
√
3. Resubstitution shows that p(β) = 0 holds for
β =
1
3
(
1 +
√
7 cos (α) −
√
21 sin (α)
)
where α = 13 arctan
(
3
√
3
)
. Taylor expansion of the corresponding terms leads to 0.445041 <
β < 0.445042, proving β ∈ [1/3, 1/2). This shows Δ1(β) = 1, which proves the lemma. 
In the proof of Lemma 5 we will make repeated use of the following simple observation:
Fact 7 The square function is monotone increasing on the positive domain, i.e.,
a− b ≥ 0 ⇔ a2 − b2 ≥ 0 holds for all a, b ∈ R, a, b ≥ 0. (12)
We solved the univariate minimization problems that arise in Lemma 5 in the classic manner,
eventually leading to the minimizer Δ1(g). This procedure is lengthy, so here we give an
uninspiring but shorter proof. The proof is based on the following Lemma:
Lemma 8 For every pair (g, δ) ∈ [1/3, β] × [0, 1] we ﬁnd
F (δ, g, g) = max
h∈[0,g]
{
F (δ, g, h) if Δ2(δ, g, h) ≥ 0
(1− δ)g if Δ2(δ, g, h) < 0 (13)
F (Δ1(g), g, g) = min
d∈[0,1]
F (d, g, g) (14)
We postpone the proof of Lemma 8 to the end of this Section.
Proof of Lemma 5 : Combining (13) and (14) from Lemma 8 we obtain
F (Δ1(g1), g1, g1) = min
δ1∈[0,1]
max
h2∈[0,g1]
{
F (δ1, g1, h2) if Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0
(1− δ1)g1 if Δ2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0.
For ease of exposition, we drop the subscripts of the variables from now on. Hence we are left
to prove maxg∈[ 1
3
,β] F (Δ1(g), g, g) =
1
2 − 13√6 ≤ 0.36392 where
F (Δ1(g), g, g) =
1
4 − 14(1− 2g)(3 − 2g)(4g − 1) + 2(1 − g)
√
g(1 − 2g)(−1 + 4g − 2g2)
It is easy to check that (10) implies that the radicand g(1− 2g)(−1 + 4g− 2g2) is nonnegative
for all g ∈ [1/3, β]. We now prove that the maximum of F (Δ(g), g, g) on [13 , β] is assumed in
1/
√
6 : Straightforward calculation leads to
F∗ := F
(
Δ(1/
√
6) , 1/
√
6 , 1/
√
6
)
=
1
2
− 1
3
√
6
.
Fixing g ∈ [1/3, β] (arbitrarily), one ﬁnds:
F∗ − F (Δ1(g), g, g) =
=
1
4
− 1
3
√
6
+
1
4
(1− 2g)(3 − 2g)(4g − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸ − 2 (1− g)
√
g(1− 2g)(−1 + 4g − 2g2)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
≥ 0 (∗) ≥ 0 (∗∗)
Here (∗) and (∗∗) are implied by the choice of g, i.e., (3− 2g) ≥ 2(1 − g) ≥ (1− 2g) ≥ 0, and
4g − 1 ≥ 1/3 > 0 hold. Finally since √6 > 2 we have 14 − 13√6 >
1
12 > 0.
The inequalities in (∗) and (∗∗) together with (12) lead to the equivalence
F∗ − F (Δ1(g), g, g) ≥ 0 ⇔(
1
4
− 1
3
√
6
+
1
4
(1− 2g)(3 − 2g)(4g − 1)
)2
− 4(1 − g)2 (g(1 − 2g)(−1 + 4g − 2g2))︸ ︷︷ ︸ ≥ 0.
=
(
11
18 +
2
3
√
6
(3− g) + (1− g)2
)(
g − 1√
6
)2
Here the second inequality holds for the chosen g, since the term can be reformulated as shown
under the brace, where (3− g) > 0 holds by the restriction g ∈ [1/3, β].
Thus we showed F∗ = F (Δ1(1/
√
6), 1/
√
6, 1/
√
6) ≥ F (Δ1(g), g, g), proving the lemma, since
g ∈ [1/3, β] was chosen arbitrarily and 1/√6 ∈ [1/3, β] is implied by 0.40 ≤ 1/√6 ≤ 0.41 < β.

It now remains to prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8 :
Fix some pair (g, δ) ∈ [1/3, β] × [0, 1]. We rewrite (13) as
F (δ, g, g) ≤
(
max
h∈[0,g]
{
F (δ, g, h) if Δ2(δ, g, h) ≥ 0
(1− δ)g if Δ2(δ, g, h) < 0
)
≤ max
h∈[0,g]
F (δ, g, g) (15)
and prove it as follows: Brief calculation together with (1 − g) > 0 lead to Δ2(δ, g, g) =
(1 − g)δ/(1 − g + δ) ≥ 0. So there is a h∗ ∈ [0, g], namely h∗ := g, such that Δ2(δ, g, h∗) ≥ 0.
This implies the ﬁrst inequality in (15).
Observe that to prove the second inequality in (15), it suﬃces to show that
F (δ, g, g) ≥ (1− δ)g and F (δ, g, g) ≥ F (δ, g, h) for all h ∈ [0, g] (16)
both hold – independently of the value of Δ2. Quick calculation proves the ﬁrst inequality of
(16): Recall that the choice on (g, δ) implies (1− g) ≥ 0, 2δg ≥ 0, and (1− 2g) ≥ 0, yielding
F (δ, g, g) − (1− δ)g = (1− g) δ
(1− g) + δ (2δg + (1 − 2g) ) ≥ 0.
To obtain the second inequality of (16), we show that for the chosen δ, g, the function F (δ, g, h)
is monotone non-decreasing on h ∈ [0, g]: Recalling h ≤ g ≤ 1/2 we ﬁnd (1−2h) ≥ 0, implying
dF (δ, g, h)
dh
=
(1− 2h)(1 − δ)2 + gδ(1 − δ)
(1− g) + δ ≥ 0.
This ﬁnally proves (16), and thus the second inequality in (15), concluding the proof of (13).
To prove (14) ﬁx some d ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily and deﬁne p(g) := g(1− 2g)(−1 + 4g− 2g2), which
is the radicand appearing in F (Δ1(g), g, g). Brief calculation leads to
(F (d, g, g) − F (Δ1(g), g, g)) (1− g + d) =(
(4g −1)(1 −g)3 + 2g(1 −2g)(1 −g)d + g(1 −2g)d2)︸ ︷︷ ︸ − 2(1 − g + d)(1− g)
√
p(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
≥ 0 (	) ≥ 0 (		)
To obtain (	), recall 1/3 < β < 1/2 and observe that the restrictions on g, d imply g, d ≥ 0 as
well as (4g− 1) ≥ 0, (1− g) ≥ 0, and (1− 2g) ≥ 0. Moreover we have (1− g+ d) > (1− g) ≥ 0,
showing (		). Recall also that (10) implies that p(g) ≥ 0 for the chosen g. Hence exploiting
(1− g + d) > 0 and Fact 7 we obtain:
F (d, g, g) − F (Δ1(g), g, g) ≥ 0
⇔ ((4g −1)(1 −g)3 + 2g(1 −2g)(1 −g)d + g(1 −2g)d2)2 − 4(1− g + d)2(1− g)2p(g) ≥ 0
⇔ ((1−3g)(1 −g)2 + 2g(1 −2g)(1 −g)d + g(1 −2g)d2)2 ≥ 0.
The last inequality is trivially true, which ﬁnally proves (14) since (g, d) ∈ [1/3, β]× [0, 1] were
chosen arbitrarily.

6 Games with more than 2 players
In this section we consider games with more than two players. A Nash equilibrium for multi-
player games is deﬁned in the same way as for two-player games. It is a choice of strategies
such that no agent has a unilateral incentive to deviate. We show now how the simple 1/2-
approximation algorithm for two players by Daskalakis et al. [6] may be generalized to a
procedure that reduces the number of players in the computation of an approximate equilib-
rium.
Lemma 9 Given an α-approximation algorithm for games with k−1 players, we can construct
a 12−α -approximation algorithm for k-player games.
Proof : Suppose we are given a game with k players. Pick any player, e.g. the ﬁrst player,
and ﬁx any strategy x1 for this player. If the ﬁrst player’s strategy is ﬁxed at x1, the game
becomes a k − 1 player game. Hence we may use the α-approximation algorithm to obtain an
α-approximate equilibrium (x2, . . . , xk) for the players 2, ..., k in this restricted game. Finally,
player 1 computes his optimal response r1 to (x2, . . . , xk) and plays a mix of his original strategy
x1 and the new strategy r1. Let δ be the probability that player 1 plays r1. Hence the output
of this construction is ((1 − δ)x1 + δr1, x2, ..., xk).
We will now measure the quality of this construction. The incentive to deviate for player 1
may be bounded by 1− δ. For the other players the incentive may be bounded by α(1− δ)+ δ.
By equalizing the incentives we get δ = 1−α2−α , which gives the upper bound for the incentive
1− δ = 12−α . 
We may now repeatedly apply Lemma 9 combined with the 0.3393-approximation for two-
player games of Spirakis and Tsaknakis [15] to get constant factor approximations for any
ﬁxed number of players. In particular, we get 0.60205-approximation for three player games
and 0.71533-approximation for four-player games. To the best of our knowledge this is the
ﬁrst nontrivial polynomial time approximation for multiplayer normal form games.
7 Discussion
In general, our algorithms produce solutions with large support. This is to no surprise, as
implied by negative results on the existence of approximate equilibrium strategies with small
support [1, 9].
The major remaining open question here is whether a polynomial time algorithm for any
constant  > 0 is possible. It would be interesting to investigate if we can exploit further the
use of zero-sum games to obtain better approximations. We would also like to study if our
techniques can be used for the stronger notions of approximation discussed in [12] and [8].
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